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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Andrew Garrett Barry appeals from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion 
for reduction of sentence.  On appeal, Barry argues the district court abused its discretion both by 
denying his attorney’s motion for a third continuance of the Rule 35 hearing and by denying his 
Rule 35 motion on its merits. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On June 28, 2015, Barry went to Steven and Christine Francis’ residence to retrieve a dog 
that Barry’s wife (from whom Barry was separated) had given to the Francis family.  (PSI, pp.3, 
18, 43.1)  The dog had been living with the Francis family for approximately eight months.  (PSI, 
p.18.)  Barry rang the Francis’ doorbell and, when Steven opened the door, Barry barged in to 
the residence, yelling, “‘Give me back my fucking dog.’”  (PSI, p.3.)  Barry then attacked 
Steven, punched him repeatedly in the head and face, and “‘threw [him] around like a rag doll,’” 
damaging a wall and several pieces of furniture.  (PSI, pp.3, 17.)  Barry “took [Steven] to the 
ground,” got on top of him, and began strangling Steven, at which time Steven’s 16-year-old son 
intervened and attempted to get Barry off of Steven.  (PSI, pp.3, 17-18, 26.)  Christine “grabbed 
a Glock 9mm [in] an attempt to stop” Barry, but she “hesitated to shoot as her son and husband 
were too wrapped up with Mr. Barry for a clear shot.”  (PSI, p.3.)  Barry then focused his 
attention on Christine and “started trying to grab the gun from her,” breaking her foot in the 
scuffle.  (PSI, pp.3, 17, 22.)  When Barry was unable to get the gun away from Christine, he 
grabbed the dog and threw it out the door, then fled the residence and drove away with the dog.  
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Barry Sealed.pdf.”   
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(PSI, pp.17-18.)  As a result of the attack, Steven suffered “numerous bruises and abrasions all 
over [his] body,” and Steven’s son sustained a broken finger.  (PSI, p.22.)   
The state charged Barry with robbery, burglary, battery, and malicious injury to property.  
(R., pp.45-46.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barry pled guilty to burglary and the state agreed 
to recommend a withheld judgment with “no additional jail” time; however, Barry subsequently 
failed to appear for sentencing and, as a result, the state was no longer bound by the plea 
agreement.  (R., pp.53-55, 69.)  On April 21, 2016, the district court imposed a unified sentence 
of five years, with two years fixed.  (R., pp.78-83.)  On August 18, 2016 – 119 days after 
judgment was entered – Barry filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which was not 
supported by any argument or information, but merely requested a hearing “in order to present 
oral argument and/or testimony”; he did not present any basis or justification for the request.  
(R., pp.84-85.)  Nevertheless, a hearing on the motion was set for October 3, 2016.  (R., p.6.)  
That hearing, however, was vacated (for reasons not indicated in the record) and rescheduled for 
November 10, 2016.  (R., p.6.)   
At the November 10, 2016 hearing, Barry’s counsel requested a continuance because he 
had been unable to speak with mental health court staff.  (R., p.90.)  The district court granted 
the request and continued the hearing to December 5, 2016.  (R., p.90.)   
At the December 5, 2016 hearing, Barry’s counsel again requested a continuance – 
against Barry’s wishes – because Barry’s paperwork had still not been reviewed by mental health 
court staff.  (Tr., p.3, L.18 – p.4, L.1.)  The district court denied the request for a continuance.  
(Tr., p.5, Ls.6-10.)  Prison staff subsequently advised that Barry was not available to participate 
telephonically at that time, after which Barry’s counsel renewed the request for a continuance.  
(Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25; p.7, Ls.9-15.)  The court again denied the request, but allowed Barry’s 
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counsel to make an offer of proof as to what Barry’s testimony would have been.  (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.21-25.)  After hearing argument, the district court denied Barry’s Rule 35 motion.  (Tr., p.22, 
Ls.9-10; R., pp.93-94.)  Barry filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.97-100.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Barry states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Barry’s 
 motion for a continuance to await the results of his mental health court 
 screening. 
 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Barry’s 
 Rule 35 motion for leniency. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Barry failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his attorney’s 
 motion for a third continuance of the hearing on Barry’s Rule 35 motion? 
 
2. Has Barry failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
 motion for reduction of sentence? 
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I. 
Barry Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Counsel’s 
Motion For A Third Continuance Of The Rule 35 Hearing 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Barry argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 
continue the hearing on his Rule 35 motion “to await the results of his mental health court 
screening” in light of his claims that the continuance “would not have unreasonably delayed the 
ruling on [his] Rule 35 motion” and that the denial of the continuance “prejudiced [his] 
substantive rights” because he was not given a “meaningful” opportunity to present the 
“alternative sentencing option” of mental health court.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.)  Barry has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981 P.2d 738, 746 (1999); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 
478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996).  “Interposed in this discretion is the requirement 
that a trial court must rule on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable period of time or risk losing 
jurisdiction of the matter.”  State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 627, 851 P.2d 336, 341 (1993).  
“Unless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial 
of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of 
discretion.”  Nunez, 133 Idaho at 21, 981 P.2d at 746 (citing State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 203, 
485 P.2d 144, 147 (1971)).   
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C. Barry Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
 Counsel’s Motion For A Third Continuance Of The Rule 35 Hearing 
 
Rule 35 provides both that a district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after 
judgment and that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days after judgment.  The 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion 
within a “reasonable time” after the expiration of the 120 days.  State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 
351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992).  If, however, the trial court fails to rule upon the motion 
“within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses 
jurisdiction.”  Id.   
Barry’s second motion to continue the Rule 35 hearing was made 228 days after the entry 
of judgment (109 days after his Rule 35 motion was filed) – nearly double the 120-day time 
limit.  The district court’s decision, almost eight months after the entry of judgment, to not 
further delay ruling on Barry’s Rule 35 motion was not an abuse of discretion, as the court had 
already had a “reasonable time” to rule on the motion and therefore risked losing jurisdiction.   
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar claim in State v. Matteson, supra.  
Matteson sought to delay the trial court's ruling on his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence 
pending the preparation of a written psychiatric examination report.  Matteson, 123 Idaho at 624, 
851 P.2d at 338.  The trial court initially delayed ruling on the Rule 35 motion to allow Matteson 
the opportunity to submit the psychiatric report.  Id.  However, after Matteson moved for another 
continuance because the report had not yet been submitted (approximately nine months after 
judgment), the trial court denied the motion to continue and also denied Matteson’s Rule 35 
motion without the benefit of the psychiatric report.  Id.  On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to further delay its ruling on 
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Matteson's Rule 35 motion, finding that “[t]he trial court was not obligated to wait indefinitely 
for Matteson to procure the report and risk losing jurisdiction.”  Id. at 627, 851 P.2d at 341.   
In this case, as in Matteson, the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying 
Barry’s request to further delay its ruling on his Rule 35 motion to await the results of his mental 
health court screening.  As stated above, by the time the district court ruled on Barry’s Rule 35 
motion, 228 days had elapsed since judgment (109 days since the motion was filed) and the 
hearing on the Rule 35 motion had already been twice rescheduled, most recently to allow Barry 
to procure the results of his mental health court screening.  (R., p.78; Tr., p.22, Ls.9-10.)  
Furthermore, in requesting a second continuance, Barry’s counsel acknowledged that Barry 
wished to proceed without the benefit of his mental health court screening results, and that it was 
“the second time [the victims had] shown up” for the Rule 35 hearing.  (Tr., p.3, L.24 – p.4, L.9.)   
Contrary to Barry’s appellate claim that the denial of his second motion to continue 
“prejudiced his substantive rights” because he was not given a “meaningful” opportunity to 
present the “alternative sentencing option” of mental health court, the district court was clearly 
aware that mental health court was a sentencing option and that Barry was being screened for 
mental health court.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8; R., p.90; Tr., p.3, Ls.21-23.)  The district court did 
not need the results of Barry’s mental health court screening to meaningfully consider whether 
probation with mental health court was an appropriate option.  Had the district court determined 
that mental health court was a viable alternative for Barry, it could have – as Barry’s counsel 
requested – taken the Rule 35 motion under advisement until the screening results were 
submitted, or placed Barry on probation with the condition that he apply to and successfully 
complete mental health court.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-7; p.14, Ls.8-11.)  The court chose not to do so, 
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stating that Barry “posed a certain threat to society and he needed to have that sentence imposed 
to protect society” (Tr., p.21, L.23 – p.22, L.1), and: 
The Court considered retaining jurisdiction at the time the sentence was imposed.  
The Court also considered probation; however, given the severity of his actions, 
given the complexity of the -- of Mr. Barry, the Court felt that the only way to 
really protect society and deter him and others from engaging in this type of 
activity was to impose the sentence that the Court did. 
 
(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-8).  Given the district court’s expressed reasoning, it is clear the court would 
have reached the same decision whether or not Barry was accepted into mental health court.  The 
court meaningfully considered whether a sentence other than imprisonment was appropriate and 
determined that Barry was not a suitable candidate for an alternative sentencing option.  As such, 
there was no need for the court to further delay ruling on Barry’s Rule 35 motion to await the 
results of his mental health court screening.  Barry has failed to show that the district court’s 
decision, almost eight months after the entry of judgment, to deny Barry’s second motion to 
continue the Rule 35 hearing was an abuse of discretion. 
 
II. 
Barry Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Rule 35 
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Barry argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion 
for a reduction of sentence in light of his status as a first-time felon, appropriate adjustment to 
life in prison, qualification for minimum security housing, claim that his sentence does not 
provide him access to treatment programs, and because there are community-based mental health 
treatment programs available.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.)  Barry has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence 
under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
 
C. Barry Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Rule 
 35 Motion 
 
To prevail on appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, Barry must “show that [his] 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the 
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  A review of the record shows Barry has 
failed to satisfy his burden. 
Barry did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he provided no new 
information that demonstrated his sentence was excessive.  The district court was aware, at the 
time of sentencing, of Barry’s status as a first-time felon, that there are community-based 
treatment programs available, that Barry had sold his house and was no longer neighbors with 
the victims, and that he had employment available.  (R., pp.74-75; PSI, pp.4-5, 8, 30, 32-33.)  
Barry’s complaint about the conditions of his confinement – that his sentence does not provide 
him access to treatment programs – is likewise not “new” information.  It is well known that 
prisoners are most often placed in treatment programs nearer to their date of parole eligibility, 
and the availability of other treatment options does not render Barry’s sentence excessive.  See 
e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993) (“While the appellant 
points to the evidence in the record that he is capable of being rehabilitated … his possibility of 
rehabilitation, standing alone, is not enough to meet his burden of showing 
unreasonableness…”); State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 294, 805 P.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App.1991) 
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(“Sentence of confinement is not rendered unreasonable simply because it will arguably have a 
negative effect on prisoner's rehabilitation.”)  Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative 
treatment is an issue more properly framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or 
under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”  State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520, 
777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 
motion).   
With respect to Barry’s assertion that he adjusted appropriately to life in prison and 
qualified for minimum security placement, this is – as the district court noted – no less than what 
is expected of inmates committed to the Department of Correction.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-19.)  
Moreover, in State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that where, as here, a defendant presented no other new information in support of his 
Rule 35 motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving little or no weight to the 
defendant’s good behavior while in prison (a trial court's denial of defendant's motion for 
reduction of sentence was not an abuse of discretion; defendant's prison behavior did not provide 
valid grounds for a reduction in sentence).  Barry’s acceptable conduct while incarcerated does 
not outweigh the seriousness of the offense and the risk he poses to the community.  In denying 
Barry’s Rule 35 motion, the court adhered to its belief that the objective of protection of society 
was the overriding factor in this case.  “When a court reasonably determines that other 
sentencing objectives outweigh the goal of rehabilitation, the court does not abuse its discretion 
in denying a motion for leniency under Rule 35.”  State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 
174, 185 (1998). The district court explained that it “felt it was appropriate that Mr. Barry have a 
fairly lengthy period of a fixed sentence to protect society yet still have an indeterminate 
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sentence should he be able to do well within the Department of Corrections and he could be 
released on parole.”  (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-13.)   
Barry presented no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion that demonstrated 
that his sentence was excessive, particularly given the risk he presents to the community.  
Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s decision to deny 
Barry’s second motion to continue the Rule 35 hearing and the district court’s order denying 
Barry’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       
 DATED this 28th day of August, 2017. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of August, 2017, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
BRIAN R. DICKSON  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Lori A. Fleming____________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
  
